Wouldn’t ZANU-PF find it unconstitutional to reduce terms to 3 years and force Mnangagwa out today?

Source: Wouldn’t ZANU-PF find it unconstitutional to reduce terms to 3 years and force Mnangagwa out today? What is good for the goose is good for the gander. Tendai Ruben Mbofana The fundamental essence of any democracy is the sanctity of the electoral contract. If you value my social justice advocacy and writing, please consider […]

The post Wouldn’t ZANU-PF find it unconstitutional to reduce terms to 3 years and force Mnangagwa out today? appeared first on Zimbabwe Situation.

Source: Wouldn’t ZANU-PF find it unconstitutional to reduce terms to 3 years and force Mnangagwa out today?

What is good for the goose is good for the gander.

Tendai Ruben Mbofana

The fundamental essence of any democracy is the sanctity of the electoral contract.

If you value my social justice advocacy and writing, please consider a financial contribution to keep it going. Contact me on WhatsApp: +263 715 667 700 or Email: mbofana.tendairuben73@gmail.com

When a citizen enters a voting booth, they are not merely selecting a face for a poster or a name for a letterhead.

They are entering into a binding, time-bound agreement.

That agreement is governed by the rules in place at the moment the ballot is cast.

In Zimbabwe, that contract specifies that a president is elected for a term of five years, with a maximum of two such terms.

To attempt to alter this agreement midway through its execution is not just a legal maneuver but a profound breach of trust that undermines the very foundations of the state.

Imagine for a moment a scenario that would surely cause an uproar within the corridors of power.

Suppose a new constitutional amendment was proposed tomorrow that reduced the presidential term from five years to three years.

If that amendment were applied to the incumbent, it would mean that the current presidency should end in a few months time.

The ruling ZANU-PF party would rightfully be the first to scream that such a move is a gross violation of the law.

They would argue that you cannot change the rules of the game while the match is still being played to the detriment of the person in office.

They would be correct in that assertion.

Yet, this logic must cut both ways.

If it is unconstitutional and unfair to reduce a term for an incumbent, it is equally unconstitutional and logically absurd to extend one for their benefit.

This principle is not a radical new invention.

It is a standard feature of mature constitutional democracies.

Consider the United States and the passage of the 22nd Amendment in 1951.

Before that time, presidential term limits were a matter of tradition rather than law, a tradition broken by Franklin D. Roosevelt when he won four consecutive elections.

When the US Congress decided to codify the two-term limit into the Constitution, they faced a critical question regarding Harry S. Truman, who was the sitting president at the time.

Despite the fact that the amendment was a direct response to the perceived overreach of the Roosevelt era, the law included what is known as a “grandfather clause.”

This clause ensured that the new restrictions did not apply to Truman.

Even though the American people wanted to tighten the rules, they recognized that you cannot retroactively change the conditions under which a leader was elected.

Truman served from 1945 to 1953, unaffected by the very law designed to prevent exactly what he was doing.

This demonstrates a vital legal truth.

Constitutional changes regarding the length or number of terms should ordinarily only affect the next person to hold the office.

This preserves the integrity of the original contract made between the voters and the elected official.

In the context of Zimbabwe’s Constitutional Amendment (No. 3) Bill, the logic remains the same.

There is nothing inherently illegal about a nation choosing to lengthen the time a president holds office or even removing term limits altogether.

Under the current legal framework, such a change would technically only require a two-thirds majority in Parliament.

However, the crisis of legitimacy arises when those changes are tailored to benefit the person currently sitting in the chair.

This is why Section 328(7) of the Zimbabwe Constitution exists as a sturdy firewall.

It explicitly dictates that any amendment that extends the length of time a person can hold office cannot benefit anyone who held that office before the amendment was passed.

This provision is the ultimate safeguard against the “president for life” syndrome that has plagued so many nations.

It acknowledges that power has a natural tendency to entrench itself.

If a leader can simply use a parliamentary majority to grant themselves more time, the election becomes a mere formality rather than a genuine expression of the people’s will.

By attempting to bypass or ignore this safeguard, the government is essentially trying to rewrite a contract after the signatures have already dried.

When the people of Zimbabwe voted in the last election, they did so with the understanding that the winner would serve a maximum of five years before asking for a fresh mandate, and would eventually step down after a maximum of ten years.

That was the deal.

If the incumbent now wishes to stay longer, he cannot simply rely on a compliant Parliament to grant him a gift that was never part of the original agreement.

The Constitution is very clear that any change to these fundamental safeguards must be taken back to the people through a national referendum.

A referendum is the only way to seek explicit approval for such a drastic departure from the democratic norm.

It is the only way to ask the other party to the contract—the citizens—if they are willing to amend the terms of the agreement.

To avoid this and attempt to push through extensions via legislative sleight of hand is to treat the Constitution like a private diary rather than the supreme law of the land.

The absurdity of the current push for term extensions is laid bare when we look at the hypothetical reduction of terms.

If the state cannot constitutionally force a leader out early by changing the law, it cannot constitutionally keep them in longer by changing the law.

Both actions represent an interference with the electoral mandate.

The law must be a shield for the people, not a tool for the powerful to reshape their own destiny at the expense of the public interest.

Zimbabwe deserves a constitutional order where the rules are fixed and the outcomes are uncertain, rather than one where the rules are fluid and the outcome is always the continued stay of the incumbent.

If the government truly believes that the people want a longer presidency, they should not fear a referendum.

Anything less is a confession that they are attempting to take by force of law what they cannot win through the sanctity of a fair and honest contract.

The post Wouldn’t ZANU-PF find it unconstitutional to reduce terms to 3 years and force Mnangagwa out today? appeared first on Zimbabwe Situation.