Evaluation of WFP Zimbabwe Country Strategic Plan 2022–2026 | World Food Programme

Evaluation of the WFP Country Strategic Plan for Zimbabwe for 2022–2026.Zimbabwe has high levels of income inequality, with 38 percent of total population living in poverty and 35 percent of urban population being food insecure. 57 percent of rural households are food insecure during lean season. Zimbabwe hosts 22,000 refugees and asylum seekers from southern […]

The post Evaluation of WFP Zimbabwe Country Strategic Plan 2022–2026 | World Food Programme appeared first on Zimbabwe Situation.

Evaluation of the WFP Country Strategic Plan for Zimbabwe for 2022–2026.
Zimbabwe has high levels of income inequality, with 38 percent of total population living in poverty and 35 percent of urban population being food insecure. 57 percent of rural households are food insecure during lean season. Zimbabwe hosts 22,000 refugees and asylum seekers from southern and eastern Africa, including 13,000 residing in the Tongogara Refugee Settlement. Refugees remain highly dependent on food assistance due to legal restrictions on their movement and employment.


What worked – or didn’t – and why?


The evaluation found that WFP was strategically positioned in Zimbabwe as a key enabler of humanitarian assistance, with its role in direct delivery becoming increasingly complementary as the scaling up of government-led assistance progressed. 
WFP assistance improved the food security of targeted populations, but refugees remained vulnerable and livelihoods and food security gains for rural communities were short-term and localized. Reconciling vulnerability-based targeting, access to complex contexts and operational independence was sometimes challenging. WFP guaranteed safety and protection at distribution sites.
Looking ahead, WFP’s added value will be increasingly focused on working through and supporting national systems.


What should WFP do? 


The evaluation makes three main recommendations: 
Shift WFP’s crisis response role away from large-scale humanitarian delivery during predictable seasonal emergencies to a focus on strengthening nationally led systems for social protection and crisis response, while retaining the ability to deliver direct assistance during extreme emergencies that exceed government response capacity; 
Concentrate rural and urban resilience programming on interventions with demonstrated effectiveness and sustainability, supported by proactive integration with partner and government systems; and
Support the institutionalization of evidence-based targeting and social protection systems within government frameworks while ensuring that WFP maintains the operational independence to determine and deliver needs-based assistance.


Download “Evaluation report”
PDF | 2.38 MB
 
Download “Annexes”
PDF | 1.36 MB
 
Document
File
Brief
PDF | 2.92 MB
Summary evaluation report (English)
PDF | 889.9 KB
Management response (English)
PDF | 158.35 KB
Summary terms of reference
PDF | 122.15 KB
Terms of reference
PDF | 1.14 MB

Source: Evaluation of WFP Zimbabwe Country Strategic Plan 2022–2026 | World Food Programme

The post Evaluation of WFP Zimbabwe Country Strategic Plan 2022–2026 | World Food Programme appeared first on Zimbabwe Situation.

Evaluation of WFP Zimbabwe Country Strategic Plan 2022–2026 | World Food Programme

Evaluation of the WFP Country Strategic Plan for Zimbabwe for 2022–2026.Zimbabwe has high levels of income inequality, with 38 percent of total population living in poverty and 35 percent of urban population being food insecure. 57 percent of rural households are food insecure during lean season. Zimbabwe hosts 22,000 refugees and asylum seekers from southern […]

The post Evaluation of WFP Zimbabwe Country Strategic Plan 2022–2026 | World Food Programme appeared first on Zimbabwe Situation.

Evaluation of the WFP Country Strategic Plan for Zimbabwe for 2022–2026.
Zimbabwe has high levels of income inequality, with 38 percent of total population living in poverty and 35 percent of urban population being food insecure. 57 percent of rural households are food insecure during lean season. Zimbabwe hosts 22,000 refugees and asylum seekers from southern and eastern Africa, including 13,000 residing in the Tongogara Refugee Settlement. Refugees remain highly dependent on food assistance due to legal restrictions on their movement and employment.


What worked – or didn’t – and why?


The evaluation found that WFP was strategically positioned in Zimbabwe as a key enabler of humanitarian assistance, with its role in direct delivery becoming increasingly complementary as the scaling up of government-led assistance progressed. 
WFP assistance improved the food security of targeted populations, but refugees remained vulnerable and livelihoods and food security gains for rural communities were short-term and localized. Reconciling vulnerability-based targeting, access to complex contexts and operational independence was sometimes challenging. WFP guaranteed safety and protection at distribution sites.
Looking ahead, WFP’s added value will be increasingly focused on working through and supporting national systems.


What should WFP do? 


The evaluation makes three main recommendations: 
Shift WFP’s crisis response role away from large-scale humanitarian delivery during predictable seasonal emergencies to a focus on strengthening nationally led systems for social protection and crisis response, while retaining the ability to deliver direct assistance during extreme emergencies that exceed government response capacity; 
Concentrate rural and urban resilience programming on interventions with demonstrated effectiveness and sustainability, supported by proactive integration with partner and government systems; and
Support the institutionalization of evidence-based targeting and social protection systems within government frameworks while ensuring that WFP maintains the operational independence to determine and deliver needs-based assistance.


Download “Evaluation report”
PDF | 2.38 MB
 
Download “Annexes”
PDF | 1.36 MB
 
Document
File
Brief
PDF | 2.92 MB
Summary evaluation report (English)
PDF | 889.9 KB
Management response (English)
PDF | 158.35 KB
Summary terms of reference
PDF | 122.15 KB
Terms of reference
PDF | 1.14 MB

Source: Evaluation of WFP Zimbabwe Country Strategic Plan 2022–2026 | World Food Programme

The post Evaluation of WFP Zimbabwe Country Strategic Plan 2022–2026 | World Food Programme appeared first on Zimbabwe Situation.

The Philippines Wants To Criminalize Disinformation and Zimbabwe Should Pay Attention. – Zealous Thierry

The Philippines is debating a question Zimbabweans should recognise immediately: what happens when a government gives itself the power to decide what counts as false information? On June 3, the Philippine House of Representatives passed the Digital Media Anti-False Information Act bill by an overwhelming 286-3 vote, with seven abstentions. The bill would criminalise knowingly […]

The post The Philippines Wants To Criminalize Disinformation and Zimbabwe Should Pay Attention. – Zealous Thierry appeared first on Zimbabwe Situation.

The Philippines is debating a question Zimbabweans should recognise immediately: what happens when a government gives itself the power to decide what counts as false information?

On June 3, the Philippine House of Representatives passed the Digital Media Anti-False Information Act bill by an overwhelming 286-3 vote, with seven abstentions. The bill would criminalise knowingly publishing or spreading false information with the intent to cause “verifiable public harm” or a “serious threat to national security.”

Conviction could mean six to 12 years in prison and a fine of up to 2 million pesos, roughly US$35,000.

The principal author is Sandro Marcos, the House Majority Leader and eldest son of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. The administration has made the legislation a top priority.

That family connection is difficult to ignore.

The Philippines has spent years dealing with the political consequences of disinformation. During the 2022 presidential election, the academic fact-checking coalition Tsek.ph and Vera Files independently concluded that Marcos Jr. was the largest beneficiary of election-related disinformation, while his principal opponent, Leni Robredo, was its biggest target.

Tsek.ph’s tracking found Marcos was the leading beneficiary of misleading online content during the campaign.

Researchers including Jonathan Corpus Ong have documented a much longer campaign to rehabilitate the Marcos family name after the 1986 uprising that removed Ferdinand Marcos Sr. from power. The former dictator’s government jailed, tortured and killed thousands, while Philippine courts later found that the family had accumulated billions through ill-gotten wealth.

This history matters because political memory is rarely a neutral thing online.

In the year before the 2022 election, pro-Marcos Facebook pages generated nearly 75 million interactions, compared with just over 39 million for Robredo, according to CrowdTangle data. Researchers linked that advantage to years of organised narrative-building.

Marcos Jr. has denied personally directing a troll operation. He has described himself as a victim of fake news and accused fact-checkers of pursuing an agenda and inventing quotations.

Now his administration is backing a law that would give the state greater power to determine which information is false and which false information has crossed the line into criminal conduct.

This is where the Philippine debate becomes particularly relevant to Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe has its own history of laws dealing with false statements and information considered prejudicial to the state. Section 31 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Cap 9:23] addresses publishing or communicating false statements prejudicial to the State and carries severe penalties in circumstances covered by the provision.

The Cyber and Data Protection Act of 2021 also created offences around the intentional transmission of false data messages through computer or information systems where the required intent to cause psychological or economic harm is established.

The legal systems are different. The political histories are different. The point is the principle.

Once the state is given broad authority to determine which statements are sufficiently false, harmful or threatening to warrant punishment, the definition of unacceptable speech can become a political question.

Zimbabwean civil society and media organisations, including MISA Zimbabwe, have repeatedly raised concerns about broadly framed laws of this kind and their potential effect on journalism, activism and digital speech.

That is precisely the danger now being debated in the Philippines.

The problem is in the wording.

The Philippine bill does not simply prohibit lying. It attaches criminal punishment to information deemed to cause “verifiable public harm” or pose a “serious threat to national security.”

Who decides?

What qualifies as verifiable public harm? How serious must the threat be? Who determines whether a statement is false before a court reaches the question of guilt?

Those questions matter because governments are political actors. They have interests, enemies, reputations to protect and narratives they would prefer the public to accept.

The Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility, through IFEX, has pointed to the irony of the legislation. The Council for People’s Development and Governance has described it as a potential road to censorship and impunity.

The National Union of Journalists of the Philippines has documented 10 journalists and media workers killed and 242 alleged press freedom violations since Marcos Jr. took office.

That does not prove that every prosecution under the proposed law would be politically motivated. It does demonstrate why journalists are nervous about handing the government a powerful new instrument over information.

AlterMidya has warned that allowing the state to define false information could open the door to broader censorship. Democracy.net.ph has also raised concerns about provisions treating media personalities as an aggravating factor.

There is another reason to be cautious.

The Philippines already has expansive laws dealing with national security and terrorism. Civil society groups have argued that measures such as the Anti-Terrorism Act and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act have been used selectively against critics and activists.

A new law criminalising disinformation would therefore not exist in a vacuum. It would become another instrument in an already complicated legal environment governing political speech.

Sandro Marcos insists the legislation is aimed at intentional deception rather than criticism, debate or legitimate journalism. The House has also said the bill can be refined to strengthen protections for journalists.

That distinction is important. Democracies have a legitimate interest in stopping deliberate campaigns designed to cause real harm. Disinformation can damage elections, public health, markets and social stability.

But there is a difference between regulating the machinery that spreads falsehoods and criminalising speech according to a definition ultimately enforced by the state.

The National Union of People’s Lawyers has argued for precisely that distinction. A serious response to disinformation should examine political advertising, algorithmic amplification, commercial monetisation and foreign influence rather than simply criminalising speech after the government decides that the speech is false and harmful.

That approach attacks the infrastructure of manipulation rather than giving politicians another weapon in the argument over who gets to define reality.

For Zimbabwe, that distinction should sound familiar.

The question is never simply whether disinformation is bad. Of course it is. The harder question is who gets to decide what is disinformation, what constitutes harm, and what happens to the person who gets that judgment wrong.

Those powers look very different when held by a government you trust and when held by one you do not.

The Marcos family understands the political power of information better than most. Its history is inseparable from the struggle over how Filipinos remember the dictatorship, the 1986 uprising and the family’s return to political power.

That makes the current proposal unusually uncomfortable.

A government whose political dynasty benefited from years of narrative reconstruction is now asking for greater legal authority over false narratives.

Perhaps the Philippine government genuinely wants to protect the public from disinformation. Perhaps some version of the bill could eventually be written with sufficient safeguards.

But laws governing speech should be judged by what they allow governments to do when the government itself becomes the subject of the speech.

That is the part Zimbabwe should pay attention to.

Because once the state acquires the authority to decide which political narratives are false, the argument is no longer merely about disinformation.

It is about who gets to police the boundary between a lie, a mistake, an inconvenient fact and a political opinion.

And governments have never been particularly good at drawing that boundary when they are standing on one side of it.

Kumbirai Thierry Nhamo || Social Justice Activist

Email: kumbiraithierryn@gmail.com

Portfolio: https://muckrack.com/kumbirai-thierry-nhamo/

Blog: https://zealousthierry.art.blog/

Source: The Philippines Wants To Criminalize Disinformation and Zimbabwe Should Pay Attention. – Zealous Thierry

The post The Philippines Wants To Criminalize Disinformation and Zimbabwe Should Pay Attention. – Zealous Thierry appeared first on Zimbabwe Situation.

The Philippines Wants To Criminalize Disinformation and Zimbabwe Should Pay Attention. – Zealous Thierry

The Philippines is debating a question Zimbabweans should recognise immediately: what happens when a government gives itself the power to decide what counts as false information? On June 3, the Philippine House of Representatives passed the Digital Media Anti-False Information Act bill by an overwhelming 286-3 vote, with seven abstentions. The bill would criminalise knowingly […]

The post The Philippines Wants To Criminalize Disinformation and Zimbabwe Should Pay Attention. – Zealous Thierry appeared first on Zimbabwe Situation.

The Philippines is debating a question Zimbabweans should recognise immediately: what happens when a government gives itself the power to decide what counts as false information?

On June 3, the Philippine House of Representatives passed the Digital Media Anti-False Information Act bill by an overwhelming 286-3 vote, with seven abstentions. The bill would criminalise knowingly publishing or spreading false information with the intent to cause “verifiable public harm” or a “serious threat to national security.”

Conviction could mean six to 12 years in prison and a fine of up to 2 million pesos, roughly US$35,000.

The principal author is Sandro Marcos, the House Majority Leader and eldest son of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. The administration has made the legislation a top priority.

That family connection is difficult to ignore.

The Philippines has spent years dealing with the political consequences of disinformation. During the 2022 presidential election, the academic fact-checking coalition Tsek.ph and Vera Files independently concluded that Marcos Jr. was the largest beneficiary of election-related disinformation, while his principal opponent, Leni Robredo, was its biggest target.

Tsek.ph’s tracking found Marcos was the leading beneficiary of misleading online content during the campaign.

Researchers including Jonathan Corpus Ong have documented a much longer campaign to rehabilitate the Marcos family name after the 1986 uprising that removed Ferdinand Marcos Sr. from power. The former dictator’s government jailed, tortured and killed thousands, while Philippine courts later found that the family had accumulated billions through ill-gotten wealth.

This history matters because political memory is rarely a neutral thing online.

In the year before the 2022 election, pro-Marcos Facebook pages generated nearly 75 million interactions, compared with just over 39 million for Robredo, according to CrowdTangle data. Researchers linked that advantage to years of organised narrative-building.

Marcos Jr. has denied personally directing a troll operation. He has described himself as a victim of fake news and accused fact-checkers of pursuing an agenda and inventing quotations.

Now his administration is backing a law that would give the state greater power to determine which information is false and which false information has crossed the line into criminal conduct.

This is where the Philippine debate becomes particularly relevant to Zimbabwe.

Zimbabwe has its own history of laws dealing with false statements and information considered prejudicial to the state. Section 31 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Cap 9:23] addresses publishing or communicating false statements prejudicial to the State and carries severe penalties in circumstances covered by the provision.

The Cyber and Data Protection Act of 2021 also created offences around the intentional transmission of false data messages through computer or information systems where the required intent to cause psychological or economic harm is established.

The legal systems are different. The political histories are different. The point is the principle.

Once the state is given broad authority to determine which statements are sufficiently false, harmful or threatening to warrant punishment, the definition of unacceptable speech can become a political question.

Zimbabwean civil society and media organisations, including MISA Zimbabwe, have repeatedly raised concerns about broadly framed laws of this kind and their potential effect on journalism, activism and digital speech.

That is precisely the danger now being debated in the Philippines.

The problem is in the wording.

The Philippine bill does not simply prohibit lying. It attaches criminal punishment to information deemed to cause “verifiable public harm” or pose a “serious threat to national security.”

Who decides?

What qualifies as verifiable public harm? How serious must the threat be? Who determines whether a statement is false before a court reaches the question of guilt?

Those questions matter because governments are political actors. They have interests, enemies, reputations to protect and narratives they would prefer the public to accept.

The Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility, through IFEX, has pointed to the irony of the legislation. The Council for People’s Development and Governance has described it as a potential road to censorship and impunity.

The National Union of Journalists of the Philippines has documented 10 journalists and media workers killed and 242 alleged press freedom violations since Marcos Jr. took office.

That does not prove that every prosecution under the proposed law would be politically motivated. It does demonstrate why journalists are nervous about handing the government a powerful new instrument over information.

AlterMidya has warned that allowing the state to define false information could open the door to broader censorship. Democracy.net.ph has also raised concerns about provisions treating media personalities as an aggravating factor.

There is another reason to be cautious.

The Philippines already has expansive laws dealing with national security and terrorism. Civil society groups have argued that measures such as the Anti-Terrorism Act and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act have been used selectively against critics and activists.

A new law criminalising disinformation would therefore not exist in a vacuum. It would become another instrument in an already complicated legal environment governing political speech.

Sandro Marcos insists the legislation is aimed at intentional deception rather than criticism, debate or legitimate journalism. The House has also said the bill can be refined to strengthen protections for journalists.

That distinction is important. Democracies have a legitimate interest in stopping deliberate campaigns designed to cause real harm. Disinformation can damage elections, public health, markets and social stability.

But there is a difference between regulating the machinery that spreads falsehoods and criminalising speech according to a definition ultimately enforced by the state.

The National Union of People’s Lawyers has argued for precisely that distinction. A serious response to disinformation should examine political advertising, algorithmic amplification, commercial monetisation and foreign influence rather than simply criminalising speech after the government decides that the speech is false and harmful.

That approach attacks the infrastructure of manipulation rather than giving politicians another weapon in the argument over who gets to define reality.

For Zimbabwe, that distinction should sound familiar.

The question is never simply whether disinformation is bad. Of course it is. The harder question is who gets to decide what is disinformation, what constitutes harm, and what happens to the person who gets that judgment wrong.

Those powers look very different when held by a government you trust and when held by one you do not.

The Marcos family understands the political power of information better than most. Its history is inseparable from the struggle over how Filipinos remember the dictatorship, the 1986 uprising and the family’s return to political power.

That makes the current proposal unusually uncomfortable.

A government whose political dynasty benefited from years of narrative reconstruction is now asking for greater legal authority over false narratives.

Perhaps the Philippine government genuinely wants to protect the public from disinformation. Perhaps some version of the bill could eventually be written with sufficient safeguards.

But laws governing speech should be judged by what they allow governments to do when the government itself becomes the subject of the speech.

That is the part Zimbabwe should pay attention to.

Because once the state acquires the authority to decide which political narratives are false, the argument is no longer merely about disinformation.

It is about who gets to police the boundary between a lie, a mistake, an inconvenient fact and a political opinion.

And governments have never been particularly good at drawing that boundary when they are standing on one side of it.

Kumbirai Thierry Nhamo || Social Justice Activist

Email: kumbiraithierryn@gmail.com

Portfolio: https://muckrack.com/kumbirai-thierry-nhamo/

Blog: https://zealousthierry.art.blog/

Source: The Philippines Wants To Criminalize Disinformation and Zimbabwe Should Pay Attention. – Zealous Thierry

The post The Philippines Wants To Criminalize Disinformation and Zimbabwe Should Pay Attention. – Zealous Thierry appeared first on Zimbabwe Situation.

The Munhumutapa empire collapsed 200 years before colonization so who decided which kingdom to resurrect?

Amid the noise, we must keep asking the tough questions. Today marks the inaugural “Munhumutapa Day,” a national public holiday declared by President Emmerson Mnangagwa to fall on his own September 15 birthday.    To directly receive my articles please join my WhatsApp Channel on: https://whatsapp.com/channel/0029VaqprWCIyPtRnKpkHe08   Across state media, a carefully curated narrative is […]

The post The Munhumutapa empire collapsed 200 years before colonization so who decided which kingdom to resurrect? appeared first on Zimbabwe Situation.

Amid the noise, we must keep asking the tough questions.

Today marks the inaugural “Munhumutapa Day,” a national public holiday declared by President Emmerson Mnangagwa to fall on his own September 15 birthday.   

To directly receive my articles please join my WhatsApp Channel on: https://whatsapp.com/channel/0029VaqprWCIyPtRnKpkHe08  

Across state media, a carefully curated narrative is being deployed, casting the president as the modern incarnation of the Munhumutapa—a living bridge to Zimbabwe’s glorious past. ​ Or, as prominent Zimbabwean theatre guru, film producer, and social justice activist Daves Guzha corrected me this morning: Mwenemutapa.  

The sovereign wealth fund has been rebranded as the Mutapa Investment Fund, and state rhetoric increasingly leans on the imagery of a revived pre-colonial empire to project political legitimacy and uninterrupted sovereignty.   Supporters of this royal transformation—led by self-styled Pan-Africanists like Joshua Maponga—frame the move as an essential act of decolonization.   

Their argument sounds compelling on the surface: Western imperialism destroyed our Indigenous state systems and forced alien democratic institutions upon us.    Consequently, they contend that the Western government system should have been completely dismantled at independence in 1980 to restore our ancestral kingdoms, rather than embracing Western democracy.  

Yet this ideological defense relies on a glaring historical fabrication: the Mwenemutapa Empire collapsed on the Zimbabwean plateau in the 1690s—a full two centuries before British colonial forces marched into the territory.   This 200-year historical void completely undermines the “decolonization” narrative and demands an uncomfortable question.  

Who decided which pre-colonial kingdom gets to be resurrected to define a 21st-century republic, and why were the kingdoms actually defeated by colonial powers erased from the equation?   When British imperialists occupied the land in 1890, they did not overthrow the Mwenemutapa.    That empire had long lost its dominance on the plateau, driven into the Zambezi valley by the Rozvi Empire under Changamire Dombo.   

For over a century, the Rozvi established a formidable state that constructed intricate stone polities, unified vast territories, and successfully kept foreign powers at bay.    When the Rozvi state weakened in the 19th century, it was succeeded by the Ndebele Kingdom under Mzilikazi and later Lobengula.   

It was King Lobengula’s state centered at Bulawayo that directly confronted, negotiated with, and was ultimately destroyed by Cecil John Rhodes’ British South Africa Company.   If the goal were truly to “restore the indigenous governance structures destroyed by colonization,” logic dictates that the nation would look to the Ndebele Kingdom or the Rozvi state—the actual sovereign entities dismantled by European invasion.   Instead, the self-appointed guardians of Pan-Africanism and their political patrons perform a massive historical leapfrog.   

They jump backward past two hundred years of living, documented history to exhume a 17th-century feudal empire.    This selection is neither accidental nor an innocent celebration of heritage; it is a calculated political maneuver.   The Rozvi and Ndebele states represent complex histories of regional power shifts, ethnic integration, and direct anti-colonial resistance.   

But the Mwenemutapa title serves a far more calculated purpose.    First, it relies on a deliberate historical fabrication that ignores both geography and chronology.    The Great Zimbabwe state was centered in the southern highveld and peaked between the 13th and 15th centuries.    In contrast, the Mwenemutapa empire emerged later as a distinct polity hundreds of kilometers to the north in the Zambezi Valley.  

Second, it weaponizes the myth that the Mwenemutapa were the ones who constructed Great Zimbabwe, framing them as Karanga ancestors centered in Masvingo who ruled over a vast superpower stretching into modern-day Zambia and Mozambique.    By directly linking Mnangagwa—himself a Karanga from Masvingo—to this manufactured legacy, the regime constructs a tribalist origin story to justify exclusive Karanga hegemony today.   By selectively resurrecting the Mwenemutapa and crowning a modern political leader with its sacred royal mantle, advocates like Maponga are not decolonizing Zimbabwe.  

They are using distorted history and Karanga tribal supremacism as a shield to attack constitutional democracy.    Dismissing multi-party politics as “Western” while romanticizing absolute rule through a fabricated Karanga royal lineage is a calculated ploy to enforce one-tribe dominance.   It convenient ignores that modern constitutionalism exists precisely to protect citizens from absolute power, whether that power claims its mandate from a colonial Governor-General or an ancient feudal Emperor.  

Furthermore, this selective resurrection actively divides the nation.    Bypassing the Ndebele state and the Rozvi era to elevate a single ancient lineage as the sole symbol of state authority signals to millions of citizens that their own ancestral histories are secondary.    It replaces the inclusive promise of a multi-ethnic, democratic republic with a top-down tribal hegemony.  

Replacing modern constitutional democracy with 17th-century feudal autocracy is not liberation—it is simply swapping democratic rights for centralized tribal dominance.    As state media sings praises to the new “Munhumutapa,” Zimbabweans must reject this false retreat into feudal monarchy.   History is not a buffet where political elites and court philosophers can pick and choose which century to resurrect to justify present-day rule.    The demise of the Mutapa state over three centuries ago cleared the way for new eras, and ultimately, the shared struggle of all Zimbabweans for a free republic.  

Zimbabwe does not need a revived 17th-century empire, nor does it need self-styled Pan-Africanists peddling royal authoritarianism as decolonization.    Thousands of brave sons and daughters of the soil did not sacrifice their lives in a grueling liberation struggle just for Mnangagwa to be crowned king.   It needs a political leadership committed to the hard work of constitutional democracy, equality, and genuine national unity.   Ideals that belong to a modern sovereign nation, not an ancient court.  

Tendai Ruben Mbofana is a social justice advocate and writer. Please feel free to contact him on +263715667700 or mbofana.tendairuben73@gmail.com

Source: The Munhumutapa empire collapsed 200 years before colonization so who decided which kingdom to resurrect?

The post The Munhumutapa empire collapsed 200 years before colonization so who decided which kingdom to resurrect? appeared first on Zimbabwe Situation.