The ongoing debate over Zimbabwe’s constitutional term limits has once again ignited fierce legal and political discourse. At the centre of this debate lies the question of whether Parliament, without resorting to a national referendum, can lawfully extend the presidential term from five to seven years — and whether such a change could benefit the incumbent President.
By Tawanda Nyambirai
As someone who still holds a deep passion for law, despite not having practised it in some time, I wish to limit my submissions to three critical provisions of the Constitution: Sections 91, 95, and 328.
Section 91: Terms vs Duration
Much of the commentary has focused on Section 91, which deals with the number of terms a President may serve, rather than the duration of each term. My interest, however, lies in the latter — the length of a single term. Since Section 91 does not concern itself with duration, I will not dwell on it further.
Section 95: The Five-Year Term and Its Flexibility
Section 95(2) of the Constitution provides that:
“The term of office of the President or a Vice-President extends until—
(a) he or she resigns or is removed from office; or
(b) following an election, he or she is declared to be re-elected or a new President is declared to be elected;
And, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, their terms of office are five years and coterminous with the life of Parliament.”
The key phrase here is “except as otherwise provided in this Constitution.” This wording appears to anticipate the existence—or the potential introduction—of another constitutional provision that could stipulate a different term duration.
In essence, the five-year term limit operates by default, applying only in the absence of another express provision. Therefore, nothing in Section 95 seems to prevent Parliament, acting with the requisite constitutional majority, from introducing a new clause that states, for instance: “The duration of a Presidential term shall be seven years.”
Such an insertion would not, in my view, constitute an amendment to Section 95. Rather, it would serve as an additional provision—a clarification filling an evident gap or lacuna in the constitutional text.
Section 328: No Violation of the Term Limit Clause
Some have argued that any attempt to extend the presidential term would violate Section 328(7), which prohibits amendments that benefit incumbents in respect of term limits. However, this prohibition applies only to amendments to a term limit provision.
If Parliament were to insert a new clause defining a seven-year term without amending or deleting Section 95, such a measure arguably would not fall foul of Section 328(7). The insertion would not amend a “term limit provision,” because the Constitution, as presently drafted, does not clearly or unambiguously fix a single term duration as immutable.
A Drafting Oversight or Intentional Ambiguity?
The Constitution’s framers appear to have left the duration of the presidential term in an uncertain state. If their intention had been to make five years the fixed and exclusive term, they could have easily stated:
“The duration of a Presidential term shall be five years.”
Instead, Section 95 was drafted with an exception clause that leaves room for alternative provisions. Whether this was an oversight or deliberate ambiguity is open to interpretation, but the result is the same: the text allows for flexibility.
Conclusion
To be clear, I am not advocating for a constitutional amendment or an extension of the presidential term. My submission is a matter of constitutional interpretation: as the law currently stands, there appears to be nothing in Sections 91, 95, or 328 preventing Parliament from introducing a seven-year presidential term provision without a referendum — and nothing preventing the sitting President from benefiting from such a provision.