Why any extension of presidential tenure must go to a referendum

Tendai Ruben Mbofana

Zimbabwe may soon find itself at a constitutional crossroads, one that will test whether the 2013 Constitution is a living shield against the abuse of power or merely a decorative document, wheeled out when convenient and discarded when it becomes inconvenient.

To directly receive articles from Tendai Ruben Mbofana, please join his WhatsApp Channel on: https://whatsapp.com/channel/0029VaqprWCIyPtRnKpkHe08

Reports that a Constitutional Amendment Bill designed to pave the way for President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s stay in office beyond 2028 is ready for gazetting should alarm every citizen who still believes that constitutions exist to restrain power, not to serve it.

At the heart of this looming controversy is a familiar but deeply troubling pattern: the use of legal cleverness to defeat democratic intent.

We are told that what is being contemplated is not an extension of presidential term limits, but merely an adjustment to the “duration” of a presidential term.

This argument, popularised by some ruling party intellectuals and echoed by sympathetic legal minds, seeks to draw a neat distinction between term limits under Section 91 of the Constitution and term length under Section 95.

According to this reasoning, Parliament can lawfully extend the length of a presidential term without triggering the stringent protections that apply to term limits, including the requirement of a national referendum.

This argument may sound sophisticated, but it collapses the moment one takes the Constitution seriously as a coherent whole rather than a playground for semantic gymnastics.

Constitutions are not drafted to reward those who can find the cleverest loopholes; they are drafted to give effect to collective historical lessons and democratic values.

In Zimbabwe’s case, the overriding lesson was painfully clear: no individual should be allowed to entrench themselves in power indefinitely, as Robert Mugabe did for 37 years, with devastating consequences for the country.

It is precisely because of this history that term limits and term duration are inseparably linked.

A two-term limit means nothing if the length of those terms can be arbitrarily extended by a compliant Parliament.

To argue otherwise is to suggest that the framers of the Constitution were so naïve as to protect the number of terms but leave the duration of power wide open for manipulation.

That interpretation insults both the intelligence of the framers and the will of the people who overwhelmingly endorsed the Constitution in a referendum.

Section 328 of the Constitution was deliberately crafted as a firewall against this kind of constitutional vandalism.

It recognises that certain provisions, particularly those relating to presidential power and tenure, are too important to be left to politicians alone.

That is why amendments that extend presidential terms and benefit an incumbent require not only a two-thirds parliamentary majority, but also the explicit approval of the people through a national referendum.

It is also why the Constitution is explicit that an incumbent cannot personally benefit from such amendments.

These safeguards were not accidental; they were the very point.

Attempts to bypass these protections by claiming that a longer term does not amount to extending term limits are not just legally dubious; they are constitutionally dishonest.

They rely on reading isolated clauses in a vacuum while ignoring the broader purpose and structure of the Constitution.

Any serious court applying the doctrine of harmonious construction would be compelled to read Sections 91, 95 and 328 together, not as rival provisions competing for relevance, but as complementary safeguards designed to achieve a single objective: limiting the concentration and duration of presidential power.

In this regard, harmonious construction means reading different sections of the Constitution together so that they make sense as a whole, rather than interpreting them in isolation to produce conflicting or absurd results.

Equally unconvincing is the suggestion that the phrase “except as otherwise provided in this Constitution” in Section 95 creates a magical loophole allowing Parliament to sneak in longer presidential terms elsewhere.

That phrase exists to accommodate exceptional and clearly defined circumstances, such as states of emergency or transitional arrangements, not to serve as a back door for extending incumbency.

If such an interpretation were accepted, then no constitutional safeguard would be safe from indirect erosion, and entrenchment clauses would become meaningless.

What makes this entire episode even more disturbing is the political context in which it is unfolding.

ZANU‑PF resolutions openly calling for President Mnangagwa to remain in office until 2030 and legal challenges filed in the Constitutional Court that quote those resolutions as evidence of intent strip away any pretence that this is an abstract legal exercise.

This is a political project aimed at retaining power without seeking renewed consent from the electorate.

The Constitution is being treated not as the supreme expression of popular will, but as an obstacle to be managed.

Supporters of the proposed amendment may argue that Parliament represents the people and therefore has the authority to make such changes.

That argument misses a fundamental constitutional principle: Parliament does not own the Constitution; the people do.

Parliament is a creature of the Constitution, not its master.

On foundational questions that go to the very nature of executive power, the Constitution deliberately reserves the final word for the citizens themselves through a referendum.

To bypass that process is to substitute elite consensus for popular consent.

The danger here extends far beyond Mnangagwa’s personal ambitions.

If this manoeuvre succeeds, it will establish a precedent that every future president will be tempted to exploit, extending their own tenure by manipulating term lengths, seeking constitutional amendments that personally benefit them, or relying on compliant parliaments to bypass referenda.

A future incumbent could, for example, argue for a single presidential term of 20 years or more, claiming it is merely a change in duration rather than an extension of term limits, thereby completely undermining the safeguards meant to prevent indefinite rule.

Each new leader could push the boundaries further, normalising incremental changes to tenure, term limits, and electoral procedures, gradually hollowing out the constitutional protections designed to uphold democratic accountability.

What was intended as a safeguard against prolonged incumbency could become a blueprint for unlimited rule, eroding the very foundation of Zimbabwe’s constitutional order.

Term limits will remain on paper but evaporate in practice.

Elections will lose their significance as instruments of renewal and accountability.

Succession battles will increasingly be resolved through factional intrigue and coercion rather than democratic choice.

Zimbabwe will slide further away from constitutionalism and closer to personalised rule.

If President Mnangagwa genuinely believes that Zimbabweans want him to remain in office beyond 2028, the Constitution already provides a clear, honest and democratic route: a national referendum.

Anything short of that is an admission that the people’s verdict is feared rather than welcomed.

Constitutions are tested not when they say what those in power want to hear, but when they say “no.”

How Zimbabwe responds to this moment will tell us whether the promise of the 2013 Constitution still matters—or whether it, too, will join the long list of betrayed hopes in our political history.

• Tendai Ruben Mbofana is a social justice advocate and writer. Please feel free to WhatsApp or Call: +263715667700 | +263782283975, or email: mbofana.tendairuben73@gmail.com, or visit website: https://mbofanatendairuben.news.blog/