Zimbabwe’s growing budget, but where is the prosperity?

By Dr Shame Mugova In 2013, Zimbabwe’s government collected approximately US$3.7 billion in revenue. By 2025, collections had risen to US$8.4 billion. Treasury projects US$11.6 billion for 2026 and US$12.5 billion for 2027, against planned expenditure of US$12.8 billion. Yet a question remains: how much of this expanding fiscal capacity is translating into better lives? […]

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By Dr Shame Mugova

In 2013, Zimbabwe’s government collected approximately US$3.7 billion in revenue. By 2025, collections had risen to US$8.4 billion. Treasury projects US$11.6 billion for 2026 and US$12.5 billion for 2027, against planned expenditure of US$12.8 billion. Yet a question remains: how much of this expanding fiscal capacity is translating into better lives?

The early dollarisation years offer a revealing comparison. Between 2009 and 2013, Zimbabwe emerged from hyperinflation into relative monetary stability. Households could plan spending, while businesses could price goods and negotiate contracts more confidently. That period had unemployment, liquidity shortages and serious infrastructure problems. External assistance also supported public services. We should not romanticise it. Nevertheless, monetary predictability made a tangible difference to everyday life.

Today, nominal government revenue is much higher, yet many households remain financially insecure and public services experience funding constraints. Population growth, inflation, exchange rates and changing state obligations complicate the comparison. But they do not answer its central question: has the state become more effective at collecting revenue than the economy has become at creating widespread prosperity?

The public finance framework associated with Richard and Peggy Musgrave provides a useful test. Government should allocate resources effectively, distribute fiscal burdens fairly and promote economic stability. The Budget should therefore be judged not simply by what Treasury collects, but by what society gains.

Consider the economy’s reported size. Treasury projects GDP approaching US$69 billion in 2027. Yet Zimbabwe revised its 2023 GDP estimate from US$35.2 billion to US$44.4 billion after an economic census, an increase of about 26% for the same year. That revision may improve measurement of previously missed activity, but factories did not suddenly produce 26% more goods. Measuring more of an economy is not the same as producing more within it.

There has also been genuine growth, including an estimated 8.3% expansion in real GDP in 2025, supported partly by agricultural recovery and mining. But recovering output after drought does not necessarily establish lasting resilience. Reporting in ZiG and converting figures into US dollars adds another difficulty: changes in exchange rate assumptions can alter dollar headlines without equivalent changes in production or purchasing power.

The practical test is whether growth delivers productive employment, higher real incomes and businesses capable of expanding. A larger measured economy is not automatically a more prosperous society.

Treasury’s revenue figures invite a similar distinction. During the first nine months of 2026, it collected ZiG224.7 billion against a ZiG198.7 billion target, an overperformance of 13.1%. VAT exceeded its target by 27.2% and corporate income tax by 30.5%. But personal income tax was 5.4% below target, reflecting weaker than expected growth in the taxable payroll base.

This does not prove employment fell. It does show why stronger revenue collection should not automatically be presented as evidence of rapidly expanding formal employment. Treasury expects total revenue to rise from 16.4% of GDP in 2026 to 18.1% in 2027, and projects 22.6% by 2030. Better compliance is desirable, but collecting more effectively from existing activity differs from enabling more people and businesses to earn adequate incomes.

That distinction becomes urgent when considering who pays.

The 2027 Budget raises the monthly PAYE exemption from US$100 to US$150. Treasury estimates US$81 million in aggregate tax relief. Yet why should someone earning barely enough to survive be considered capable of paying income tax?

A worker earning US$250 monthly paid approximately US$31 in PAYE, including the AIDS levy, under the 2026 USD schedule. That left about US$219 before other deductions, from which rent, food, transport, electricity and family expenses had to be paid. The 2027 change offers relief, but does not answer whether US$150 is a realistic threshold for taxable capacity.

The Finance Minister cited a household poverty benchmark of approximately US$302 during parliamentary proceedings in 2026. A household poverty measure is not directly comparable with an individual tax threshold; dependants and the number of earners matter. Still, it highlights a basic question: how can earnings be insufficient to meet essential household needs while being sufficient to attract income tax?

A person may be employed yet remain poor. Having a salary does not mean having money left to save or withstand an emergency. Raising the exemption further would cost revenue and may benefit some higher earners if all tax bands shift. That is why Treasury should publish how many workers would gain at different thresholds, how much each income group would save, and how lost revenue might be financed. The question is not whether the state needs taxes. It is whether the threshold reflects the minimum income people require to live.

PAYE is only one part of the picture. Workers may also face IMTT on qualifying transfers and VAT when purchasing taxable goods. These are distinct taxes with exemptions, but their combined effect bears on the same household’s purchasing power.

The proposed IMTT reduction illustrates the limits of the relief. The USD rate falls from 2% to 1.75%, and the ZiG rate from 1.5% to 1.25%. On a taxable US$100 transfer, the saving is 25 cents. On US$1,000, it is US$2.50; government still collects US$17.50.

The deeper issue is taxing money transfers without regard to whether they generate profit. Consider a trader selling goods for US$1,000 and paying US$900 for replacement stock. The gross profit is US$100 before rent, wages and transport. If the US$900 supplier payment attracts IMTT at 1.75%, the charge is US$15.75, nearly 16% of gross profit. High turnover is not the same as high profitability.

Separate taxable payments along a supply chain can add costs, erode margins or contribute to higher consumer prices. Not every transfer is taxable, and removing IMTT would cost Treasury revenue. Indeed, it collected approximately ZiG12.6 billion from IMTT in the first nine months of 2026. But a tax becoming important to government does not automatically make it economically efficient.

Zimbabwe wants financial inclusion, digital payments and business formalisation. It should examine whether taxing qualifying transfers makes participation in the formal economy unnecessarily costly. Relief measured in cents should not distract from that structural question.

Consider also the cumulative burden on a household. On a hypothetical US$250 salary, the 2026 PAYE and AIDS levy was roughly US$31. A taxable US$100 payment attracted US$2 in IMTT, while a US$60 purchase consisting entirely of standard rated goods included about US$8 in VAT at 15.5%. That is around US$41 associated with three different taxable events. Actual bills vary because exemptions, credits and spending patterns differ. But the example illustrates why the adequacy of relief cannot be judged from the PAYE announcement alone.

The other side of tax justice is what citizens receive in return.

During the first nine months of 2026, Treasury collected ZiG224.7 billion and spent ZiG188.7 billion. The positive difference of ZiG36 billion reflected both stronger receipts and spending below schedule. Yet by September the Health Ministry had reportedly received only 52.8% of its annual allocation, against a nine month benchmark of 75%. The Health Minister said about 90% of released funds had been utilised. Education reportedly received around 55% of its annual allocation.

Treasury says some additional revenue financed arrears settlements, debt service and drought reserves. These are legitimate uses of public funds. They do not, however, remove the need for a transparent reconciliation showing how much went to each purpose and why essential ministries experienced delayed releases. Nor is the ZiG36 billion difference automatically a pool of uncommitted cash: outstanding bills and the timing of payments matter. The accountability question is about priorities and execution, not an unsupported claim that the additional money disappeared.

A budget allocation does not buy medicines. Money must reach the institutions responsible for delivering services.

Capital expenditure is planned to increase from roughly ZiG41 billion in 2026 to ZiG74 billion in 2027. Productive infrastructure can raise national capacity. But a road should be judged by lower transport costs, electricity projects by reliable supply, and irrigation by actual harvests and incomes sustained during drought. The success of infrastructure is measured not only by what government builds, but by what people can do because it has been built.

Employment and household outcomes make that distinction urgent. ZIMSTAT’s second quarter 2025 survey reported unemployment of about 21%, and nearly 39% among people aged 15 to 24. Informal work can provide livelihoods, but much of it produces limited financial security. Mining can grow without proportional job creation; agriculture can rebound after rain without protecting households against the next drought.

Treasury forecasts government consumption growth of 7.1% in 2027, compared with household consumption growth of 3.6% and economywide fixed investment growth of 1.7%. These are different measures, not direct evidence that public spending harms households. But they raise the question of what will sustain private investment, productivity and future employment.

Diaspora remittances, approximately US$2.45 billion in the first nine months of 2026, support consumption, education, healthcare and investment. Their contribution is valuable, but remittances are neither automatically domestic production nor proof that local earning opportunities are expanding.

Nor is resilience established by positive GDP growth alone. Treasury forecasts 3.5% growth in 2027, but models a severe drought scenario with growth around 2% and a deficit increasing from approximately US$314 million to US$828 million. Its US$400 million drought contingency provision recognises the risk. Yet preparedness should extend beyond financing emergency relief to operating irrigation, reliable power, diversified production and secure rural incomes.

Zimbabwe needs revenue, fiscal discipline and productive investment. But Treasury should examine higher PAYE thresholds against living costs, assess the cumulative burden of IMTT and other taxes, and publish clear quarterly accounts of ministry allocations, releases and services delivered. GDP should be assessed alongside real wages, productive jobs, poverty, private investment and household security.

Can workers meet basic needs and still save? Can businesses expand? Can hospitals obtain medicines? Can farmers produce through drought? Can young people build secure futures?

A government can become more effective at collecting revenue without society becoming equally more prosperous. The success of Zimbabwe’s 2027 Budget depends not on the billions Treasury collects, but on whether those resources enable people to build more productive and secure lives.

The purpose of public finance is not merely to finance the state. It is to help build an economy in which citizens can prosper.

Dr Shame Mugova is a Lecturer in Finance at Birmingham City University. He writes on finance, economic policy, governance and development, with a particular interest in Zimbabwe and Southern Africa. He writes in his personal capacity. 

Source: Zimbabwe’s growing budget, but where is the prosperity? — CITEZW

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